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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
mortgages in question had been acknowledged by a notary only
without the two attesting witnesses required under the statute.
It is to be noted that in so holding, the court apparently over-
looked the Uniform Acknowledgments Law s under which the
acts of mortgage should have been held properly authenticated
and thus admissible in evidence. The statute relied upon does
not purport to provide the only method of proving the genuine-
ness of acts under private signature. It is primarily a statute
designed to establish, prima facie, the authenticity of such acts
when executed in accordance with its provisions; it does not
exclude other methods of proving acts under private signature,
nor does it prohibit the reception in evidence of acts otherwise
properly acknowledged according to law. The mortgages in
question were executed by the mortgagor as acts under private
signature and subsequently acknowledged before the notary who
recited that the mortgagor was well known to him and that he
executed the instruments for the purposes and considerations
expressed in them. This is all that the uniform law requires, 9
and, having complied with its provisions, the mortgages should
have been admitted. The effect of this decision, if adhered to,
might well render ineffective all acknowledgments executed in




Although the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act' has now
been in effect in Louisiana for more than six years, and has been
8. LA. R.S. 35:511-513 (1950).
9. "Either the forms of acknowledgment now in use in this State, or
the folZowing, may be used in the case of ... written instruments, whenever
such acknowledgment is required or authorized by law for any pur-
pose: ....
"1. In the case of natural persons. ...
"On this __ day of - 19 before me personally appeared
AB (or AB and CD), to me known to be the person (or persons)
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowl-
edged that he (or they) executed it as his (or their) free act and
deed .. " LA. R.S. 35:511 (1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Adopted by La. Acts 1948, No. 431, p. 1168, and La. Acts 1948(E.S.),
No. 22, p. 56, now LA. R.S. 13:4231-4242 (1950).
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used quite extensively, there has been a dearth of Louisiana
jurisprudence limiting the boundaries of its availability.2
One extremely important question which has not as yet been
answered is whether the declaratory action may be employed as
a substitute for any of the four real actions in Louisiana. Actu-
ally, all of the latter are largely in the nature of declaratory
actions seeking to ascertain the rights of the parties to the im-
movable in controversy. The reality of the "award" prayed for
additionally, which serves to take the action out of the classifi-
cation of declaratory, varies with the particular real action." The
weakness of the present Louisiana system of real actions is
attributable to the role played by possession. Historically, the
function of possession has been to determine which of the parties
would carry the burden of proving title. With the unfortunate
duplication of the real actions in Louisiana, 4 it has taken on the
additional, and less constructive, function of determining which
of the four competing remedies can be employed. It was in-
evitable, therefore, that sooner or later an effort would be made
to substitute the more flexible declaratory action for the techni-
cally appropriate real action.
The Supreme Court twice sidestepped a determination of
this most important question in La Terre Co. v. Naquin.5 Origin-
2. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court heretofore has concerned
itself principally with appellate jurisdiction over declaratory .actions. See
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term-Cil
Procedure, 12 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 184, 191-192 (1951); and The Work of
the Louisia na Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term---Ci4A Procedure, 13
LOUiSIANA LAW REVIEW 306, 316-317 (1952). The recent decisions of the inter-
mediate appellate courts, however, have had the effect of limiting the avail-
ability of the Declaratory Judgments Act. Cf. Gary v. Marquette Cas. Co.,
72 So.2d 619 (La. App. 1954); and see the unfortunate decision in Hastings v.
McDowell, 75 So.2d 383 (La. App. 1954).
3. For instance, the action to establish title to real estate authorizes
merely an adjudication of the rights of ownership of the parties. In the
possessory action where the plaintiff has not been ousted the award prayed
for is the theoretical formula of "maintaining and quieting petitioner in
possession of the property." In the possessory action where plaintiff has
been ousted from possession the award prayed for is a restoration of pos-
session; and similarly, in the petitory action It is for the delivery of
possession. Unless damages are sought, it is only in the action of jactitation
that we find a realistic award prayed for: that defendant be ordered to
assert his pretensions of ownership within a delay to be assigned by the
court, or be forever barred from asserting title to the immovable.
4. After the Revolution, French procedure limited its real actions to
two-petitory and possessory. Whatever criticism the French proceduralists
may make of their system, there appears to be no dissatisfaction with the
operation of their present real actions.
5. 225 La. 210, 72 So.2d 481 (1954).
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ally, this was a declaratory action6 brought to determine the
ownership of a large tract of land in Terrebonne Parish. Defen-
dant excepted to the suit on the ground that
"... the suit for a declaration of ownership has no basis in
the law of Louisiana, is unknown, unauthorized, and unwar-
ranted, and is an attempt to circumvent the rules relating to
real actions; that this form of action deprives defendants of
benefiting from the rights vested in them under the Louisi-
ana real action system, by virtue of their possession."
These exceptions were referred to the merits by the trial judge,
and the defendants unsuccessfully applied to the Supreme Court
for supervisory writs. The latter were refused on the ground
that, in the event of an adverse judgment, the defendants had an
adequate remedy by appeal.
The defendants in the first action then filed a suit against
the original plaintiffs, and others, in Naquin v. La Terre Co. This
was a jactitory action which alleged the new plaintiffs' possession
of the immovables in controversy, the slander of title by the new
defendants through their execution and recordation of purported
conveyances, the damages sustained by the new plaintiffs in
protecting and proving their. possession, and the irreparable
injury suffered through the defendants' drilling of oil wells on
the land. The prayers in this suit were that injunctive relief
be given to protect their possession, that the defendants be or-
dered to bring a petitory action asserting their pretensions of
ownership, that in default thereof defendants be decreed forever
barred from asserting any claims to the property, and that defen-
dants' recorded claims be cancelled from the conveyance records
of the parish.
The defendants in La Terre Co. v. Naquin, taking the position
that the first suit was also one in jactitation, 'excepted therein
on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have possession of the
immovable in controversy. On the same day, these defendants
moved to consolidate the two actions. The exception was referred
to the merits, and the motion to consolidate denied by the trial
6. Both the litigants and the court referred to the action as one for a
declaratory judgment. Actually, a specific award was prayed for addition-
ally "that all instruments recorded by the defendants be ordered cancelled
and erased from the public records of Terrebonne Parish." 72 So.2d at 484.
So far as the declaratory action was concerned, this is of no moment, as the
Uniform Act authorizes the rendition of a declaratory judgment "whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed." LA. R.S. 13:4231 (1950).
[VOL. XV.378
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judge. On the application of these defendants, alternative super-
visory writs were issued by the Supreme Court.
The defendants in the second suit filed exceptions on the
grounds that the pendency of the first action precluded prosecu-
tion of the second, and that the plaintiffs had no possession of the
immovables in controversy. The plaintiffs again moved to con-
solidate the two actions for trial. The trial judge sustained the
defendants' exception of lis pendens, and ordered a stay of pro-
ceedings in the second suit until a disposition of the first. The
motion to consolidate was again denied. On the application of
the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court issued alternative supervisory
writs to review these rulings of the trial court.
Both proceedings were consolidated in the Supreme Court,
and a single opinion rendered for both cases. Though the issue
was pressed upon the court strongly by the applicants for writs,
the Supreme Court again refused to decide whether the declara-
tory action could be employed as a substitute for a real action,
and restricted its consideration to a review of the four other
rulings of the trial court. The latter's denial of the two motions
to consolidate the actions for trial was held proper, on the ground
that the issues in the two cases were completely different. As
the first suit was characterized as a declaratory, rather than a
jactitory, action, the Supreme Court likewise refused to disturb
the trial court's ruling referring to the merits the exception of
lack of possession filed in the first suit.
The most interesting question decided by the Supreme Court
was with respect to the exception of lis pendens pleaded in the
second suit. In sustaining the action of the trial court in staying
proceedings in the second suit until the disposition of the first
action, the Supreme Court went considerably beyond the Code
rules governing this exception. Under the pertinent Code provi-
sion,7 lis pendens can be pleaded successfully only when the two
actions (1) are between the same parties, (2) are on the same
cause of action, and (3) have the same object. Since the first suit
was one brought to assert ownership, and the second to protect
possession, the last two of these Code requisites of lis pendens
were completely lacking. Further, under the appropriate Code
provisions,8 the effect of sustaining the exception of lis pendens
7. Art. 335(2), LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
8. Arts. 94, 335(2), LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870. A stay of proceedings
may be ordered in an action in rem or quaosn-rem brought in a Louisiana
court, so as to avoid interference with the jurisdiction over the res previ-
ously acquired by a non-Louisiana court. Ferriday v. Middlesex Banking
Co., 118 La. 770, 43 So. 403 (1907).
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is the dismissal of the second suit. Here, the court imposed the
novel, though less drastic, penalty of staying proceedings in the
second suit.
The only other case involving the application of the Declara-
tory Judgments Act decided during the past term presented no
difficult question of law. In Succession of Rolling,sa the executrix
presented two olographic wills of the decedent for probate and
execution. After the probate of the wills, one of the legatees pre-
sented a demand for collation. While this matter was pending,
the executrix petitioned for a declaratory judgment interpreting
the wills, so that their provisions might be executed in accord-
ance with law. This petition was dismissed by the trial court
under exceptions of prematurity and no right and no cause of
action. On appeal, short shrift was made of these exceptions.
Pointing out the express language of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act authorizing the rendition of declaratory judg-
ments in probate cases,9 the court held the prior demand for
collation in no way precluded the right of the executrix for a
declaratory judgment, or rendered her petition premature.
EXCEPTIONS
In strict theory, the exceptions of no right of action and no
cause of action have separate. and distinct functions to perform in
the procedural system of Louisiana. Yet, in the great majority
of cases, defendants plead these two exceptions together, without
making any effort to demarcate their respective provinces.
Actually, this practice is not nearly as loose as it appears, since
these two exceptions complement each other, and the rules
governing each are identical, with but a single exception: While
evidence may be adduced on the trial of the exception of no right
of action to controvert the allegations of the petition, the excep-
tion of no cause of action is triable only on the face of the peti-
tion, and evidence may not be introduced to refute its allegations.
The Supreme Court found it necessary to distinguish the
functions of these two exceptions in one case decided during the
past term.' 0 Plaintiff had sued for specific performance of an
8a. 224 La. 23, 68 So.2d 744 (1953).
9. "Any person interested as or through an executor . . . legatee, heir,
. . . in the administration . . . of the estate of a decedent, . . . may have a
declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto: . . . (3) To deter-
mine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, includ-
ing questions of construction of wills and other writings." LA. R.S. 13:4234
(1950).
10. Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Saint Denis Securities Co., 225 La. 51,
72 So.2d 257 (1954). This case is also discussed at page 282 supra.
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alleged contract, consisting of an exchange of letters, to sell
timber lands. After forcing the production of these letters under
a prayer for oyer, through the exceptions of no right and no
cause of action the defendant raised the issues (1) that the official
of defendant signing these letters had no written authority to sell
any of the lands of defendant, and (2) that the exchange of
correspondence did not constitute any binding contract. On the
trial of these exceptions, without objection by plaintiff, defen-
dant introduced considerable evidence to support its two de-
fenses. The trial court found both sustained, and dismissed the
suit.
On appeal, plaintiff complained of the trial-court's consider-
ation of the evidence introduced on the trial of the exceptions,
contending that neither defense could be interposed through the
exception of no right of action, and that the exception of no
cause of action should have been tried only on the face of the
petition. This argument was properly brushed aside by the
Supreme Court, since the allegations of the petition had been
enlarged by the evidence received without objection. The evi-
dence introduced was held sufficient to sustain both defenses re-
lied on. The appellate court, unfortunately, used some loose
language in distinguishing between the functions of the two ex-
ceptions, in saying:
"Generally speaking, an exception of no right of action serves
to question the right of a plaintiff to maintain his suit, i.e.,
his capacity to sue or his interest in the subject matter of the
proceeding, whereas an exception of no cause of action ad-
dresses itself to the sufficiency in law of the petition and the
exhibits attached thereto."" (Italics supplied.)
The inclusion of this italicized language, in describing the func-
tions of the exception of no right of action, may easily serve to
confuse its functions with those of the exception to procedural
capacity. 12
The only other case of interest in this field decided during
the past term was State ex rel. Marston v. Marston,3 involving
11. 72 So.2d at 258.
12. In Outdoor Electric Advertising v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So.2d 375
(1945), it was specifically held that the exception of no right of action cannot
be employed to question the procedural capacity of the plaintiff to sue.
Termini v. McCormick, 208 La. 221, 23 So.2d 52 (1945) gives a much more
accurate differentiation of the respective functions of the exception of no
right of action and no cause of action than the principal case.
13. 223 La. 1046, 67 So.2d 587 (1953), 15 LOUISIANA LAW REv EW 708 (1954).
The case is discussed, in connection with another point, at page 395 et seq.
infra.
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the exception of lis pendens. Originally, on June 10, 1952, the
relatrix filed suit in Orleans Parish to obtain a divorce under the
two-year separation statute, alleging that she and the defendant
had voluntarily lived separate and apart since June 8, 1950. The
respondent answered, alleging that the separation occurring on
June 8, 1950, was not voluntary because plaintiff did not then
have the requisite mental capacity to determine or form the
intent to live separate and apart. While the first suit was pend-
ing in Orleans Parish, respondent filed suit against relatrix on
March 20, 1953, in Caddo Parish, for a divorce on the ground
that the parties had voluntarily lived separate and apart since
March 18, 1951. Relatrix excepted to the second suit on the
ground that it was precluded by the pendency of the first suit
between the same parties, on the same cause of action, and hav-
ing the same object. The trial judge in the second suit overruled
the exception of lis pendens, and the Supreme Court granted
supervisory writs to review his ruling.
The Supreme Court recognized that lis pendens and res
judicata were correlatives, and sought to apply the traditional
civilian test of determining whether any judgment rendered in
the first suit would be res judicata of the second action. Holding
that such would be the result, the court experienced no difficulty
in concluding that the exception of lis pendens should be
sustained.
There is much more merit, however, in the respondent's po-
sition than can be gleaned from a cursory reading of the Supreme
Court's opinion. Respondent argued that, since the two periods
of separation were different, the causes of action in the two suits
were not the same, and that consequently lis pendens would not
lie. To support its position, respondent relied strongly upon
McCubbin v. McCubbin,14 an earlier case involving the old
seven-year separation statute.
In the McCubbin case, where plaintiff brought his fourth
action for a divorce on the ground of the voluntary separation
of the spouses for more than seven years, the defendant pleaded
as res judicata three earlier judgments of dismissal' 5 rendered in
14. 163 La. 20, 111 So. 481 (1927).
15. In the first McCubbin case, plaintiff sued for a divorce on the ground
of seven years' separation, some of which occurred prior to the adoption of
the statute. This suit was dismissed under an exception of no cause of
action, based on the erroneous contention that the statute could not be
given retroactive operation. In his second suit, plaintiff alleged that the
parties had lived separate and apart since the date alleged in the first suit.
[VOL. XV
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previous suits by plaintiff. In overruling the exception of res
judicata, the organ of a unanimous court said: 16
"[W]e agree with the judge of the civil district court that
the plea is not well founded-not because the judgment
dismissing the first suit was based upon a wrong interpreta-
tion of the statute, but because the plea of res judicata is
never an appropriate defense in a suit for divorce on the
ground that the parties have been living apart for 7 years.
It is not possible for a judgment, declaring that the plaintiff
is not entitled to a divorce on the ground of 7 years' separa-
tion from his wife, to declare that he shall not be entitled
to a divorce on that ground at some future time. Two such
suits filed at different dates are not founded upon the same
cause of action." (Italics supplied.)
The italicized language above was swept aside by the court in
the Marston case on the ground that this point was dictum, and
not necessary to the decision in the case. With all due deference,
the writer submits that the decision in the McCubbin case was
pitched squarely upon this point. The error which the writer
believes the Supreme Court fell into in the Marston case is indi-
cated by this language of its opinion in the latter case:17
"If the cause of action has matured, there is only one
judgment that could be rendered, viz.: judgment of divorce
and such judgment would be res judicata to any subsequent
suit under this statute." (Italics supplied.)
There is another judgment which could have been rendered in
the Marston case-the same judgment which was rendered three
times in the McCubbin cases-a judgment dismissing the suit.
This case was allotted to the same judge who had dismissed the first suit,
and he sustained exceptions of no cause of action and res judicata, and
dismissed the second suit. In the third action, plaintiff again alleged that
the parties had lived separate and apart since the date alleged in the first
suit. This case was allotted to another judge, who sustained an exception of
res judicata, and his ruling was affirmed on appeal. See McCubbin v. Hutch-
ings, 150 La. 949, 91 So. 350 (1922). In his fourth suit, plaintiff again sought
a divorce on the ground of seven years' separation, and again alleged that
the parties had lived separate and apart since the date alleged in the first
suit. This time the exception of res judicata was overruled, and plaintiff
was granted a divorce. On appeal, the judgments of dismissal rendered in
the first three suits were held not to constitute res judicata of the fourth
action. McCubbin v. Hutchings, supra, was expressly overruled. See McCub-
bin v. McCubbin, 163 La. 20, 111 So. 481 (1927).
16. 163 La. at 23, 24, 111 So. at 482.
17. 67 So.2d at 590.
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Should the trial court find in the first Marston case that relatrix
lacked requisite mental capacity during the first nine and a half
months of the alleged two-year voluntary separation, it would
have to render judgment dismissing the suit; and certainly this
judgment would not be res judicata of a subsequent suit by
respondent for a divorce on the ground of voluntary separation
for a two-year period commencing after the nine and a half
months. The Supreme Court in the Marston case properly held
that the test as to lis pendens was the same applicable to res
judicata, but it never actually applied the latter test. It is true
that a judgment of divorce rendered in the first suit would pre-
clude the prosecution of any second suit for divorce, but this
would follow only because after this judgment the parties would
cease to be married, and the second suit would become moot.
There would be the same result in the case of two suits for di-
vorce, the first based on adultery and the second on two-years
separation; yet it is clear that the two causes of action would be
different, and that lis pendens would not lie to preclude prosecu-
tion of the second suit. The test of lis pendens is not whether
a particular judgment which might be rendered in the first suit
would preclude prosecution of the second action, but whether
any definitive judgment which might be rendered in the first
would be res judicata of all of the issues presented in the second.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The sanforizing of its appellate jurisdiction which has char-
acterized the work of the Supreme Court during recent years
continued during the past term of court.18 Evidence of the in-
tention of the Supreme Court to abdicate its "original jurisdiction
for the determination of questions of fact affecting its own ap-
pellate jurisdiction in any case pending before it"' 9 continues to
18. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term
-Civil Procedure, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 184, 189-194 (1952); The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-Civil Procedure, 13
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW, 306, 313-317 (1953); The Work of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Civil Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW
RviEw 198, 206-213 (1953).
19. The quoted language is that of the second paragraph of LA. CONST.
Art. VII, § 10. This matter is discussed in The Work of the Loui.siana Su-
preme Couirt for the 1952-1953 Term-Civil Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEw 198, 206-213 (1953). For some indication of the time unnecessarily
lost by litigants as the result of the refusal of the Supreme Court to exer-
cise its original jurisdiction in aid of its appellate jurisdiction to consider
stipulations and affidavits of the parties as to facts determinative of the
[VOL. XV
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accumulate. During the past term, the court again refused to
consider a stipulation between the parties as to the amount in
controversy.2 0
The liberality of the Louisiana rules relating to the joinder
of parties, though effective in eliminating an unnecessary multi-
plicity of actions, presents some difficulties with respect to ap-
peals from the judgments rendered in suits cumulating a number
of different claims. One of these difficulties, on which over the
years the Louisiana courts have vacillated, is the test of appellate
jurisdiction to be applied. Is the "amount in dispute" the aggre-
gate amount of all such claims, or must the test be applied
individually to each such claim? Two cases decided during the
past term held that each claim so cumulated in the suit must
meet the jurisdictional test.21 These holdings accord with civilian
principles of procedure, and with the majority of the cases
decided by our Supreme Court in recent years. There is, how-
ever, a contrary line of authorities, 22 which has not yet been
overruled expressly, and which may bob up later to cause diffi-
culty.
In five cases where the issue of appellate jurisdiction was
presented, the Supreme Court reached its decisions without
difficulty. A motion to dismiss the appeal was denied in the first23
of these cases, involving the right to renew an existing lease for
an additional term of two years at an annual rental of $1,600.
The value of the right of occupancy in dispute was held to be
measured by the $3,200 rental to be paid therefor during the
amount in controversy, see Beene v. Pardue, 223 La. 417, 65 So.2d 897 (1953),
transferred to the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit on June 1, 1953,
on the ground that there was no affirmative showing in the record that more
than $2,000 was involved; and 67 So.2d 337 (La. App. 1953), remanded to
the trial court for the introduction of further evidence on September 30,
1953, on the ground that there was no affirmative showing in the record
that any specific amount was in controversy. The writer is informed that,
after this remand, the trial court found that more than $2,000 was involved
and again granted the appeal to the Supreme Court, where the case is
presently pending.
20. State ex rel. Schwehm v. Morrison, 224 La. 811, 70 So.2d 881 (1954).
21. Hernandez v. Ethyl Corp., 224 La. 470, 70 So.2d 92 (1954); Bascle v.
Perez, 224 La. 1014, 71 So.2d 551 (1954).
22. Rhodes v. Scholfield, 6 La. Ann. 251 (1851); State ex rel. St. Cyr v.
Jumel, 34 La. Ann. 201 (1882); La Groue v. New Orleans, 114 La. 253, 38 So.
160 (1905); Learned & Koontz v. Texas & P. Ry., 128 La. 430, 54 So. 931 (1911);
Sandlin v. Coyle, 143 La. 121, 78 So. 261 (1918). Cf. Heirs of Baillio v. Prud-
home, 8 Mart.(N.s.) 338 (La. 1829); Lartigue v. White, 25 La. Ann. 291
(1873); Hammond v. Ross, Mann. Unrep. Cas. 359 (La. 1877-1880); Dalcour v.
McCan, 37 La. Ann. 7 (1885).
23. Board of Levee Com'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Lacassin, 224 La.
570, 70 So.2d 128 (1954).
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additional term. In the second case,24 the court noticed its own
lack of appellate jurisdiction, and transferred the appeal. The
controversy related to an individual one-half interest in a tract
of land, and the record indicated that the entire tract was worth
less than $2,000. In the third case, 25 the relator appealed from a
judgment denying a mandamus to the proper Democratic Execu-
tive Committee to certify relator as a duly qualified candidate
for the Democratic nomination for the office of district judge.
Following its most recent decisions, the Supreme Court held
there was no amount in dispute in a suit to assert and enforce a
political right. Although the appeal presented a question of the
constitutionality of a statute26 requiring the two judges of the
judicial district to be residents of different parishes, since the
trial court had held the statute constitutional, the Supreme Court
held that this issue conferred no jurisdiction upon it.2 7 The ab-
sence of an affirmative showing of appellate jurisdiction in the
transcript accounted for the transfer of the two remaining ap-
peals. The first of these28 presented for review a judgment re-
fusing to enforce restrictive covenants running with defendant's
title. The other 29 involved the plaintiff's right to enforce a
servitude of passage and to require the removal of obstacles
thereto.
On June 29, 1950, the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit
transferred the appeal in Abbott v. Temple" to the Supreme
Court on the ground that it fell within the appellate jurisdiction
of the latter. This suit was a third opposition brought in the dis-
trict court to enjoin the execution of a judgment of a city court
against movables alleged to be the property of the third oppo-
nent, rather than the judgment debtor. The city court judgment
was for $418.51, and the movables seized by the marshal in execu-
tion thereof were alleged by the third opponent to be worth
$2,700. Under a line of decisions 31 heretofore unquestioned, the
24. Morgan v. Hathaway, 225 La. 367, 72 So.2d 880 (1954).
25. Knobloch v. 17th Judicial Dist. Democratic Exec. Com., 225 La. 591,
73 So.2d 432 (1954).
26. La. Acts 1952, No. 136, p. 325, amending LA. R.S. 13:621 (1950).
27. Under LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10, the Supreme Court is given appellatejurisdiction "in all cases wherein an ordinance of a parish, municipal cor-
poration, board, or subdivision of the State, or a law of this State has been
declared unconstitutional."
28. Harris v. Pierce, 224 La. 585, 70 So.2d 134 (1953).
29. Lerner Shops of Louisiana v. Reeves, 224 La. 33, 68 So.2d 748 (1953).
30. 47 So.2d 443 (La. App. 1950).
31. Hagan v. Hart, 6 Rob. 527 (La. 1844); San-I-Baker Corporation v.
Magendie, 157 La. 643, 102 So. 821 (1925); Etheridge-Atkins Corp. v. Johnson,
183 So. 37 (La. App. 1938).
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third opposition was brought in the district court, even though
it was sought to regulate the effect of the city court judgment on
the theory that the city court would have lacked jurisdiction to
determine the third opponent's ownership of property worth
$2,700. The intermediate appellate court, noticing an admission,
dictated into the record by counsel for the third opponent during
the contradictory trial of the third opposition that the movables
were worth $2,700; held that it had no appellate jurisdiction; and
ordered the appeal transferred to the Supreme Court.
When the case was finally reached for argument in the Su-
preme Court nearly four years later, that court held the transfer
by the court of appeal erroneous and ordered the appeal re-
transferred.32 An analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion indi-
cates that it relied upon three different reasons for its action in
re-transferring the appeal: (1) there was no affirmative showing
that the movables in controversy were worth more than $2,000,
as the record did not indicate that the defendants concurred in
third opponent's admission that they were worth $2,700; (2) that
even if this admission had been so concurred in, the court would
disregard such a stipulation by the parties; and (3) that while
third opponent's title to the movables was in dispute, it was
only challenged to the extent of $418.51, which is below the
minimum jurisdictional limit of the Supreme Court.
The first ground assigned by the Supreme Court smacks of
those subtle technicalities so popular a half century ago when a
lawsuit was regarded as a duel between skilled protagonists.
The very purpose of dictating an "admission" into the record
during the progress of the trial is to indicate an agreement by
both parties upon the facts stipulated, and thus eliminate the
necessity for the introduction of evidence. Technically, it may
be more effective in such cases to have the admission expressly
made by both parties, and to have the record indicate the oppos-
ing party's express acquiescence; but there is no room for hair-
splitting when the record indicates the opposing party's tacit
acquiescence, through his counsel's failure to object to an "ad-
mission" just dictated. The second ground affords additional
evidence of the Supreme Court's intention to abdicate its original
jurisdiction in aid of appellate jurisdiction, discussed above. The
third ground assigned appears to run counter to every Louisiana
decision on the subject rendered heretofore, and is apt to blur
32. Abbott v. Temple, 224 La. 1042, 71 So. 561 (1954).
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and obscure the settled rules relating to the institution of a third
opposition to assert ownership of property seized in execution
of a judgment of a court of limited jurisdiction.88
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court during the past
term presented questions as to the appealability of judgments. In
one,3 4 the intermediate appellate court dismissed an appeal on
the ground that the judgment was not appealable. A surviving
spouse had appealed from a judgment rendered in the succession
proceedings of her deceased husband recognizing her as entitled
to an undivided one-half interest in her husband's net estate,
contending that she was also entitled to the usufruct of the other
half, to which deceased's minor children had been held entitled.
As the net estate was only $180.25, and the issue presented on
appeal was with respect to the widow's usufructuary rights on
half of this amount, the appeal was dismissed. Under a writ of
review, the Supreme Court properly reversed the court of ap-
peal's dismissal of the appeal.3, Pointing out that the case was
a succession proceeding, of which the district courts were granted
exclusive original jurisdiction, 6 our highest court held that the
case fell within the constitutional provision granting courts of
appeal appellate jurisdiction over all cases of which the district
courts "have exclusive original jurisdiction, regardless of the
amount involved,"3 7 and which did not fall within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In the second case involving the appealability of judgments,3
the Supreme Court granted a writ of review as of right to resolve
a conflict between the decisions of two of the intermediate ap-
pellate courts.39 In both, sugar planters had brought proceedings
33. The rationale of the cases cited in note 31 supra is that, since the
value of the property claimed by the third opponent constitutes the amount
in dispute exceeding the maximum jurisdiction of the court of limited juris-
diction which rendered the judgment, the third opposition to arrest the
judicial sale must be filed in a court of general jurisdiction. Under the theory
adopted by the Supreme Court in Abbott v. Temple, supra, it would appear
that the third opposition might have been filed in the city court which ren-
dered the judgment. Such a view would conflict with the settled rule to the
contrary adopted in every case which has yet considered the question.
34. Lloyd v. Succession of Lloyd, 66 So.2d 404 (La. App. 1953).
35. Succession of Lloyd, 224 La. 911, 71 So.2d 324 (1954).
36. The district courts "shall have unlimited and exclusive original juris-
diction in ... all probate and succession matters .... LA. CONST. Art.
VII, § 35.
37. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 29.
38. Godchaux Sugars v. Ockman, 73 So.2d 577 (La. 1954).
39. Between the decisions in Godchaux Sugars v. Ockman, 68 So.2d 206
(La. App. 1953), by the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans, and Milli-
ken & Farwell, Inc. v. Brown, 69 So.2d 85 (La. App. 1953), by the Court of
Appeal, First Circuit.
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under the share croppers' act 40 to eject striking agricultural la-
borers from the homes furnished by the employers. These houses
had been furnished to the defendants free of cost, for an in-
definite term, and without any contract or agreement. In both
cases, judgments had been rendered ejecting the defendant, and
the latter had sought to appeal suspensively therefrom. The trial
courts had refused to grant an appeal, and the defendants had
sought a mandamus from the proper intermediate appellate
courts to coerce the trial courts into granting the appeals. The
Orleans Court of Appeal had concluded that these suits were
for the possession of real property not held under lease, and that
since the district courts had exclusive original jurisdiction, the
cases were appealable, regardless of the amount involved.41 On
the other hand, the First Circuit Court of Appeal had concluded
that these suits were for the resolution of rental or lease agree-
ments, and that since the rentals involved did not exceed $100,
the cases were not appealable. 42 The Supreme Court approved
the decision of the Orleans Court of Appeal. Justices of the
peace, it was pointed out, had original jurisdiction in only three
types of cases involving $100 or less: (1) suits for moneyed
judgments, (2) suits for possession or ownership of movables,
and (3) suits by landlords for the possession of the leased prem-
ises. As the cases under consideration did not fall within any of
these categories, the district courts had exclusive original juris-
diction thereof, and hence the cases were appealable regardless
of the amount involved.43
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Only final judgments, and interlocutory judgments which
may cause irreparable injury, may be appealed from in Louisiana.
Two of the most difficult questions of appellate procedure in this
state are differentiating final from interlocutory judgments, on
the one hand, and distinguishing between interlocutory judg-
ments which may cause irreparable injury and those which
cannot, on the other. One of the cases decided during the past
term44 presented both of these difficulties. A fraternal benefit
society sued one of its officers, and the latter's surety, for an
accounting, and alleged that the defendant officer had purchased
40. LA. R.S. 13:4911 et seq. (1950).
41. Godchaux Sugars v. Ockman, 68 So.2d 206 (La App. 1953).
42. Milliken & Farwell, Inc. v. Brown, 69 So.2d 85 (La. App. 1953).
43. Applying the provisions of LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 29.
44. Grand Lodge, Knights, etc. v. Charles, 224 La. 785, 70 So.2d 684 (1954).
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various pieces of immovable property with funds belonging to
plaintiff. The prayer was for a solidary judgment against both
defendants for the amount of funds due, and for the recognition
of plaintiff's vendor's privilege upon the property purchased by
defendant with plaintiff's funds. A lis pendens was recorded in
the mortgage office of the parish shortly after the institution of
the suit. The defendant officer promptly ruled plaintiff into court
to show cause why the inscription of the lis pendens should not
be cancelled and erased from the mortgage records of the parish,
as having been inscribed thereon improvidently and without legal
authority. On the trial of the rule, the court found that plaintiff
was not entitled to any vendor's privilege on the immovables
under the facts alleged in the petition, and consequently made the
rule absolute. Plaintiff then moved for and was granted a sus-
pensive appeal from this judgment. When the transcript was
lodged in the Supreme Court, defendant moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that it was taken from a judgment which
was purely interlocutory, and which could not cause irreparable
injury.
The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss. In sup-
port of its position, the court relied upon the test applied in an
earlier case to determine whether an interlocutory judgment
might cause irreparable injury:
"[I] f the interlocutory decree complained of, pregnant though
it may be with consequences to either party, is of such a
nature as to be covered by the appeal from the final judg-
ment, and if the decree of the appellate court can restore
the parties, without the loss of any right under the plead-
ings, to the identical position which they respectively occu-
pied before the rendering of the interlocutory decree . ..
the injury is clearly not irreparable. ' '45
Since, reasoned the court, plaintiff had no right under the plead-
ings to a vendor's privilege on the immovables in question, the
cancellation of the lis pendens was an interlocutory judgment
which caused no irreparable injury, and hence could not be ap-
pealed from separately from the final judgment rendered in the
case.
Justice McCaleb rendered a strong dissenting opinion from
the court's refusal to grant a rehearing. His first position was
that the judgment appealed from was a final judgment, since it
45. Fields v. Gagn6, 33 La. Ann. 339, 340 (1881).
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determined once and for all the question of whether defendant's
property was encumbered with plaintiff's claim. This argument
appears to beg the very question which it decides. 46 The dissent-
ing Justice's second argument, however, appears to the writer
to be unanswerable. He states:
"But even though the judgment be viewed as inter-
locutory, the dismissal of the appeal was incorrect because
the decree was one which unquestionably caused irrepara-
ble injury. The conclusion reached in our opinion is premised
on a finding that, since plaintiff did not have a lien against
the property, it did not suffer injury. The holding that
plaintiff does not have a lien and privilege seems to be cor-
rect but, as this is the issue to be determined on the merits
of the case, it does not afford a good ground for the dismissal
of the appeal. According to the authorities, the test to be
used to determine if an interlocutory decree may work ir-
reparable injury is whether the court, by its final decree, can
restore the parties to the identical position they occupied
before the judgment complained of was rendered. Obviously,
in this case plaintiff cannot be placed in the same position
it occupied prior to the rendition of the decree cancelling
the lis pendens because it now lies within defendant's power
to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber the property.
'47
Bascle v. Perez" is a veritable refresher course on appellate
procedure in Louisiana. Limitations of space allow our considera-
tion of but three of the unusually interesting points presented
therein. Plaintiffs originally moved for a suspensive appeal to
the court of appeal, and, though unnecessary, citations of appeal
were served on defendants. Thereafter, believing that the appeal
had been taken to the wrong court, plaintiffs filed a supplemental
and amended motion that the appeal be made returnable to the
Supreme Court. This motion was granted, but as plaintiffs had
not prayed for a citation of appeal upon the defendants, none
was issued and served. Based upon their failure to receive cita-
tion of the amended order of appeal, one of the appellees moved
to dismiss the appeal. Appellants countered with the argument
that, since both orders of appeal were rendered at the same
46. Both a final judgment, and an interlocutory judgment which may
cause irreparable injury, would "decide the question once and for all," if not
appealed from timely. See Cary v. Richardson, 35 La. Ann. 505 (1883), and
cases cited therein.
47. 224 La. 785, 792, 70 So.2d 684, 686.
48. 224 La. 1014, 71 So.2d 551 (1954).
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session of court at which the judgment appealed from had been
rendered, there was no necessity for the appellees to be cited in
connection with either appeal. Pointing out that the appellees
had been misled by the citation to answer the appeal to the court
of appeal, though citation was not necessary, the Supreme Court
held the appellees should have been cited to answer the appeal
prosecuted to the Supreme Court, under the amended order.
The second unusual point in the case was presented through
the appellant's argument that appellee had waived his objection
to the lack of any citation of appeal, by joining this ground with
additional objections that neither the appeal bond nor the trans-
cript of appeal had been filed timely. The court admitted that
the lack of citation of appeal is waived if presented after the
appellee requests any other relief from the appellate court, but
pointed out that it was incorporated as the first of the three
grounds relied upon for dismissal. Since the appellee was re-
quired to urge all three grounds for dismissal at the same time,
his first ground was not waived through the urging of the other
two in the same motion to dismiss.
The third point was attributable to a rather common cause
of appellate difficulties: the liberal rules of cumulation of actions
in Louisiana. The two plaintiffs had cumulated separate and dis-
tinct causes of action in the single suit against both defendants.
One of the causes cumulated fell within the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court; the other was cognizable on appeal
only by the intermediate appellate court. The court decided the
cause over which it had appellate jurisdiction, and transferred
the appeal on the other to the court of appeal. The Supreme
Court's solution of this problem is so simple, so sane and sensi-
ble, that probably the full effect of the decision may be lost to
the casual reader. Actually, the case, is a landmark decision,
which goes much beyond the precedents available heretofore.49
There have been at least two instances in the past where one of
the cumulated actions has disappeared on appeal through a
curious process of juristic legerdemain,50 and at least a third
49. See State v. J. Foto & Bro., 134 La. 154, 63 So. 859 (1914); and cf.
State ex rel. Chehardy v. New Orleans Parkway Commission, 215 La. 779,
41 So.2d 678 (1949).
50. See Newsom v. Starns, 174 La. 955, 142 So. 138 (1932); Applewhite v.
New Orleans Great Northern R. R., 148 So. 261 (La. App. 1933). These cases
were overruled on another point in Cavalier v. Original Club Forest, 220 La.
183, 56 So.2d 147 (1951), 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 500 (1952); but they remain
as effective illustrations of a problem which can be solved simply through
an application of the principal case.
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instance where this result was averted only through the accidents
of procedure. 51
As a general rule, appellate courts do not review issues which
have not been presented to and considered by the trial courts.
One exception to this rule, in civilian jurisdictions, is that appel-
late courts may consider any legal issue tendered by a peremp-
tory exception filed in the appellate court. The Louisiana Code
provision voicing this exception to the general rule provides
that:
"Although in general parties before the Supreme Court
are not allowed to plead other matters than' those which
were before the inferior court, nevertheless it may depart
from this rule, when the exception taken is one of those
which may be pleaded at any period of a cause, and the
proof of it appears by the mere examination of the record."
(Italics supplied.) 52
In Succession of Douglass,53 in the trial court the executors
resisted a rule brought by the tutrix of two minor legatees to
deliver the legacies on the grounds that (1) they were condi-
tioned upon the minors reaching the age of majority, and (2) it
was the testator's intention to have the executors retain the
legacies in trust until the legatees reached the age of majority.
The trial court overruled these defenses and ordered the legacies
delivered. The executors appealed suspensively from this judg-
ment. In the appellate court, the executors filed an exception of
no cause of action, and thereunder urged the further defense
that the portion of the will providing for these legacies was null
as containing a prohibited substitution. Calling attention to the
language of the pertinent Code provision italicized above, the
Supreme Court held that it had the discretion to consider, or
refuse to consider, the exception pleaded. In view of the incon-
sistency of this new defense with those asserted in the trial court,
and the attack upon the will made by the very persons selected
by the testator to defend it, the court refused to consider the
exception. The holding of the court as to its discretionary power
to consider exceptions pleaded in that court is even more strongly
51. See Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., 189 La. 183, 179 So. 75 (1938),
where plaintiff was finally successful in obtaining a review of all of his
plural demands only when the Supreme Court granted a writ of review and
passed upon all phases of the case. Cf. Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., 171
So. 468 (La. App. 1937), 179 So. 93 (La. App. 1937).
52. Art. 902, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
53. 225 La. 65, 72 So.2d 262 (1954).
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supported by the original French text than by the English text
of the pertinent Code provision.q4
SUPERVISORY PROCEDURE
For the past three-quarters of a century the Supreme Court
of Louisiana has been vested with "control of, and general super-
vision over all inferior courts" of the state.'5 This power is
plenary, and its exercise unfettered, except by those self-imposed
rules which our highest court has adopted in the interest of an
orderly and efficient administration of justice.16 Despite the
complete absence of limitations, this system has worked smooth-
ly and well in the past and, in this respect, might well serve as
a model for other American judicial systems.
One of the potential difficulties of the system, which fortu-
nately in the past has proved entirely theoretical, is the possi-
bility that applications to the Supreme Court for supervisory
writs to control the proceedings in trial courts might be applied
for frivolously and solely for the purpose of delay. The possi-
bility has not been contemplated by the Supreme Court Rules,
although since 1896, our Supreme Court has had a rule providing,
in substance, that:
"The party or attorney intending to apply to this court
for a writ of certiorari or review, or for any remedial writ,
shall give to the judge whose ruling is complained of, and
to the party made respondent, . . . such notice as may be
deemed necessary to stay further proceedings pending the
application to the Supreme Court .... ,,57
This rule has never been understood by the profession in
Louisiana as meaning that all proceedings in the trial court were
automatically stayed when one of the parties gave notice of his
54. "Quoiqu'en g~n~ral i ne soit pas permis aux parties de plaider devant
la cour supreme d'autres exceptions que celles qui ont t6 oppos~es en
premiere instance, n~anmoins, la cour suprdme pourra ddroger 4 cette rugle,
lorsque l'exception est une de celles qui, d'aprbs la loi, peuvent se plaider en
tout 6tat de cause et que as preuve r~sulte de l'inspection seule des pibces
de la procedure." (Italics supplied.) Projet of the Louisiana Code of Practice
of 1825, 2 LA. LEGAL ARcHIvEs 141 (1937).
55. The language quoted is from Art. VII. § 10, LA. CONST. of 1921; but see
the identical provisions in Art. 94, LA. CONST. of 1913; Art. 94, LA. CONST. of
1898; and Art. 90, LA. CONST. of 1879.
56. See MCMAHoN, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 165, n. 0.11 (Supp. 1952).
57. The quotation is from Rule XIII, § 2, Revised Rules of Supreme
Court of Louisiana (1951); but see the identical provision in Rule XIII, § 2,
Rules of Supreme Court of Louisiana, 171 So. xiii (1931), and the similar
provision in Rule XII, § 2, Rules of Supreme Court of Louisiana, 48 La. Ann.
xvi (1896).
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intention to apply to the Supreme Court for remedial writs, but
rather as conferring discretion upon the trial judge to stay pro-
ceedings, if he deemed it in the interest of justice. In fact, in
1912, it had been held that proceedings in the trial court were
not stayed even when the Supreme Court issued alternative
remedial writs.58 Quite recently, the Supreme Court has squarely
held that:
"Clearly, therefore, mere notice to the district judge of
a litigant's intention to apply for writs does not have the
effect of staying further proceedings in that court."5 9
This rule left the trial court with discretion as to whether or not
he should stay further proceedings, after he received notice of a
party's intention to apply to the Supreme Court for remedial
writs. This rule practically eliminated frivolous and dilatory
applications for supervisory writs, as the trial judge was not
compelled to suspend proceedings pending the filing of the appli-
cation and the Supreme Court's action thereon. Further, the un-
successful litigant was fully protected in cases where his appli-
cation for remedial writs was meritorious, as he had the right
to pray for an order staying all proceedings in the trial court
when he petitioned for supervisory writs. In such cases, when
our highest court found probable cause for its exercise of super-
visory jurisdiction, it issued the stay order along with the alter-
native writs. These rules worked well-until they were dis-
rupted by the decision in State ex rel. Marston v. Marston.60
Some of the facts of the Marston case have been set forth
above, in the discussion of the exception of lis pendens filed
therein,61 but a more complete statement is necessary for a full
perspective of the decision. Relatrix originally sued in Orleans
Parish for a divorce on the ground of two years' separation, and
respondent's answer set up a defense which, if established, would
have defeated the action. Subsequently, respondent sued relatrix
in Caddo Parish for a divorce on the ground of two years' separa-
tion, and respondent pleaded lis pendens of the first suit. This
exception was overruled on April 13, 1953, and relatrix was in-
formed then by the trial judge that respondent had filed a request
for the entry of a default on April 15th, unless an answer were
filed. Relatrix then notified respondent and the trial judge of
58. Arthur v. Dupuy, 130 La. 782, 58 So. 570 (1912).
59. First National Bank Bldg, Co. v. Dickson & Denny, 202 La. 970, 980,
13 So.2d 283, 286 (1943).
60. 223 La. 1046, 67 So.2d 587 (1953), 14 LOUiStANA LAW R~viw 708 (1954).
61. See page 381 et seq. supra.
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her intention to apply to the Supreme Court for remedial writs
immediately. This application for writs, and for a stay order,
was filed on April 15th. That same day a preliminary default was
entered, which was confirmed, and a judgment of divorce granted
on April 22nd. Later in the day, on April 22nd, the Supreme
Court granted relatrix's application, and issued alternative
remedial writs and a stay order. Subsequently, relatrix moved
for the vacation of the default judgment. From the denial of this
motion by the trial court, relatrix sought, and was granted, sup-
plemental remedial writs. After a consideration of the matter,
the Supreme Court made all of the alternative writs peremptory,
vacated the default judgment, sustained relatrix's exception of
lis pendens, and dismissed respondent's suit.
The opinion of the Supreme Court was pitched squarely
upon the language of its rule quoted above, and the recent case
holding that notice of intention to apply for remedial writs does
not stay proceedings in the trial court was squarely overruled.
The court's position, on these points, is summarized by the fol-
lowing language from its opinion:
"Section 2 of Rule XIII was not considered in [the re-
cent] case and the statement cannot be regarded as an inter-
pretation of this section of the rule. The statement cannot
be reconciled with the plain words of Section 2 of Rule
XIII. In order to leave no room for doubt we reiterate that
the formal notice of intention to apply for remedial writs
stays all proceedings in the lower court for a reasonable time
sufficient to afford the applicant an opportunity to make his
application to this Court. '6 2
Why, if mere notice of the intention to apply for writs stays
proceedings, it should have been considered necessary for rela-
trix to also pray for a stay order, and for the court to issue a
stay order, is not explained by the opinion. But, perhaps, this
was a matter of no moment. What was important was the broad
avenue opened up by the Marston case for successfully employ-
ing dilatory tactics through frivolous applications for super-
visory writs. No grass grew on this avenue before it began to be
used as a thoroughfare.
A prominent and wealthy lady of Baton Rouge had died
testate some little time before and, as no children survived her,
she left her large estate to her husband. Her will was probated,
62. 223 La. 1046, 1052, 67 So.2d 587, 589 (1953).
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the succession administered, and in due course the deceased
husband was recognized as the universal legatee and sent into
possession. Subsequenty, a relative of the deceased filed suit to
annul the deceased's testament on grounds not pertinent here,
and to be recognized as the sole heir of the deceased. Defendant
immediately answered the suit, and had it assigned for trial on
the earliest available date. Shortly before the scheduled trial,
plaintiff discontinued his suit, and immediately instituted a new
suit with substantially identical allegations. Defendant again
answered, and had the second suit assigned for the earliest trial
possible. Shortly before the assigned trial of the second suit,
plaintiff again discontinued his suit, and immediately filed a third
suit, with substantially identical allegations. This time, to pre-
vent plaintiff from further delaying the trial through another
discontinuance, defendant took the precaution of reconvening
for a declaratory judgment against the plaintiff, declaring the
will valid. Defendant immediately had the case assigned for trial
at the earliest available date. The trial was lengthy, lasting
over a period of some weeks. When one of the trial judge's
rulings during the course of the trial was adverse to plaintiff,
the latter immediately served notice of his intention to apply to
the Supreme Court for remedial writs to review the ruling com-
plained of. Under the Marston case, this notice automatically
stayed all further proceedings in the trial. In due course, plain-
tiff filed his application in the Supreme Court, which was op-
posed by defendant, and the writs applied for were denied by
the appellate court. The case was then re-assigned for trial, and
in due course reached. Shortly thereafter, the trial judge again
found it necessary to rule against the plaintiff, and again the
latter served notice of his intention to apply for remedial writs.
Again, under the Marston case, the trial judge felt that this notice
had the effect of staying all further proceedings in the trial.
Plaintiff's second application for supervisory writs was again
opposed by defendant, and again denied by the Supreme Court.
But this time, the appellate court rendered a per curiam opinion"
severely restricting the Marston decision. The extent of this
qualification is indicated by the following language from the
court's opinion:
"In order, however, to avoid any further misunderstanding,
and to make the position of this court abundantly clear, any




language to be found in the Marston case to the contrary not-
withstanding, in the trial of all cases, whether civil or
criminal, it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge
to determine whether or not the proceedings during the
course of a trial being had before him should be stayed while
the litigant complaining of an adverse ruling seeks writs to
this court, and that it is also within the sound discretion of
the trial judge to determine and fix the time within which
such application should be made, and that it is only when
there has been a clear abuse of that discretion that this court
will interfere, and, even then, only when it is shown that
the abuse of that discretion will result in irreparable injury
to the complaining party. '6
4
How much substance now remains in the shell of the Marston
case is anybody's guess. At least two possible constructions of
the court's latest position compete for acceptance. The first is
that mere notice of intention to apply for remedial writs still
stays all proceedings in the trial court, except after the com-
mencement of the trial, when the trial judge has discretion
either to stay proceedings or to continue the trial. This construc-
tion precludes the use of such dilatory tactics during the progress
of the trial, but permits their use in connection with the trial
of exceptions, rules, and motions prior to trial. The second possi-
ble construction is that mere notice of intention to apply for
remedial writs does not ipso facto stay all proceedings, and that
the trial judge has discretion to continue proceedings, but sub-
ject to nullification by the Supreme Court if it disagrees with
the trial judge's ruling. While this construction is definitely
preferable to the first, it appears to have two disadvantages: the
needless waste of time and effort if proceedings subsequent to
notice of intention are nullified; and the justification it offers
for suspending all proceedings by the more timid and less ener-
getic judges. A third solution of the problem appears to be the
simplest and most effective - the express overruling of the
Marston case.
CONSERVATORY WRrrS
Three trailers were attached on the ground of the non-
residence of the defendant in Bass v. Prewett. 5 A Texas corpora-
tion filed a third opposition in the attachment proceeding,
64. 72 So.2d at 473.
65. 74 So.2d 150 (La. 1954).
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alleged that it had a valid chattel mortgage on each of the trailers
seized, and prayed that it be paid the amounts secured thereby
out of the proceeds of the judicial sale with preference and prior-
ity over the attaching creditor. Both the trial and appellate courts
rejected this opposition on the ground that the third opponent
had failed to prove the execution in Texas of the chattel mort-
gages asserted. Each of these mortgages purported to be signed
by the defendant, and to be acknowledged by a notary public,
who declared that Prewett was well known to him, and that he
acknowledged that he had executed the instrument for the pur-
pose and consideration expressed therein. The Supreme Court
held that the chattel mortgages had not been proven, as no testi-
mony had been offered of their execution. It was pointed out
that the instruments were not self-proving, since they were
neither authentic acts66 nor instruments acknowledged by the
affidavits of the appearer or any of the attesting witnesses.6 7
The opinion does not cite, or discuss the possible effect of, the
Uniform Acknowledgments Act.6 8 Unfortunately, the exact lan-
guage of these purported Texas acknowledgments is not quoted,
so that the reader might determine the applicability of the uni-
form statute. From the court's statement of facts, however,
there appears to be some possibility that these acknowledgments
constituted substantial compliance with the Uniform Acknowl-
edgments Act.
REAL ACTIONS
Under the influence of French procedure,6 9 the Louisiana
Code of Practice of 1825 prohibited the maintaining of a posses-
sory and a petitory action at the same time. If plaintiff instituted
both actions either simultaneously or separately, he was deemed
to have waived the possessory action, and permitted to continue
the prosecution only of the petitory action.7 0 A defendant in the
possessory action could not bring a petitory action against his
adversary until after the rendition of judgment in the possessory
action; and if judgment were rendered against defendant, only
66. Under Art. 2234, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
67. Under LA. R.S. 13:3720 (1950).
68. LA. R.S. 35:511-513 (1950).
69. Arts. 26, 27, CODE DE PROCPDURE CivE. For a discussion of the origin
and effects of these provisions, see Millar, The Joinder of Actions in Con-
tinental Civil Procedure, 28 ILL. L. REV. 177, 184 (1933).
70. Art. 54, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825. This provision has been retained
as Art. 54, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
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after satisfying this judgment.71 These procedural rules were
somewhat of an anomaly, as the lawful owner of immovables, out
of possession, would be required to pay to the possessor the fruits
and revenues which the owner might have received, before being
permitted to enforce his rights of ownership, and to recover these
fruits and revenues from the possessor.
The Louisiana legislature eliminated this anomaly in 1920,
by amending Article 55 of the Code of Practice72 so as to make it
read as follows:
"Petitory and possessory actions shall not be cumulated
or joined together except by consent of parties. But he who
is sued on a possessory action may bring a petitory action
for, or an action to establish title to, all or any part of the
property involved in the possessory action, without in any
way affecting the pending possessory action, provided that if
judgment be rendered in the petitory action in favor of
plaintiff, the pending possessory action shall abate."
Despite the beneficial effect of this relaxed procedure, the
reported decisions do not indicate that any considerable use of
it has been made.
Hill v. Richey73 serves to emphasize the potential usefulness
of the amended Code provision. Plaintiff therein had brought a
possessory action to be quieted in the possession of timber lands,
and coupled therewith a demand for damages for the timber
removed by the defendants. A judgment was rendered by the
trial court quieting plaintiff in his possession, but rejecting his
claim for damages, with full reservation of his right to sue later.
On the first appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
insofar as it recognized plaintiff's possession, but remanded the
case for further proceedings, inter alia, to assess the damages to
which plaintiff was entitled. 74 Various proceedings not pertinent
here were taken by the litigants thereafter in the trial court,
and seven months after the remand by the Supreme Court one
of the defendants filed a petitory action against the original
plaintiff, asserting the ownership of the immovables in question.
The defendants in the possessory action then moved to consoli-
71. Art. 55, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825. This provision was retained as
Art. 55, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870, until 1920.
72. La. Acts 1920, No. 202, § 1, p. 334. Section 2 of this statute amended
Art. 56, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
73. 74 So.2d 190 (La. 1954).
74. Hill v. Richey, 221 La. 402, 59 So.2d 434 (1952).
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date this suit with the petitory action. The trial court denied the
motion, and rendered a moneyed judgment against the defen-
dants. The latter appealed, and in the Supreme Court moved for
a stay of proceedings to await the termination of the petitory
action pending in the court below, but the Supreme Court prop-
erly denied this motion to stay, and affirmed the judgment ap-
pealed from.7 5
By the time an application for rehearing was applied for, the
trial court had rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the
petitory action. Based upon this fact, Justice McCaleb wrote a
strong dissenting opinion in connection with the court's refusal
to grant a rehearing. After stressing the language of the amended
Code article "that if judgment be rendered in the petitory action
in favor of plaintiff, the pending possessory action shall abate,"
the learned justice said:
"Accordingly, [inasmuch] 76 as the judgment has now
been rendered in the petitory action, this possessory action
has abated. The fact that the petitory action may not be
final, in the sense that an appeal may be taken therefrom to
this court, should not deter us from protecting Richey's
rights under that judgment. In my opinion, the least that
could be done would be to grant a rehearing and stay fur-
ther proceedings in this suit until the petitory action judg-
mnent is finally reviewed on appeal."77
Though no per curiam was written by the majority of the
court, justifying their unwillingness to grant a rehearing, such
justification is found in the failure of the unsuccessful litigant
to bring his petitory action until seven months after the Supreme
Court had remanded the possessory action for further proceed-
ings in the court below. This point appears to have been dis-
posed of adequately by the following language of the original
opinion:
"It necessarily follows that to allow the defendant Richey at
this stage of the proceedings to take advantage of his laches
and failure to promptly assert his title to the tract of land
involved would be most inequitable ....
The most encouraging aspect of the Richey case is that it
75. 74 So.2d 190 (La. 1954).
76. The writer has taken the liberty of substituting modern English for
the Chaucerian adverb used by the learned dissenting Justice.
77. Id. at 193.
78. Id. at 193.
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indicates an apparent willingness on the part of the Supreme
Court to grant a stay of the possessory action, if the defendant
therein promptly brings his petitory action. Unless some such
stay is granted, the benefits of the amended Code provision will
never be realized, as the plaintiff in the possessory action neces-
sarily has a time lead over the plaintiff in the subsequent petitory
action.
